A basic premise of representative democracy is that all those subject to policy should have a voice in its making. However, policies enacted by electorally accountable governments often fail to reflect the interests of disadvantaged minorities. This paper exploits the institutional features of political reservation, as practiced in Indian states, to examine the role of mandated political representation in providing disadvantaged groups influence over policymaking. I find that political reservation has increased transfers to groups which benefit from the mandate. This finding also suggests that complete policy commitment may be absent in democracies, as is found in this case. (JEL D72, D78, H11, H50) 
There are strong moral and economic arguments suggesting that it is in the interest of society to improve the economic standing of historically disadvantaged minority groups. 1 In democracies, the use of legislative policy to bring about such improvements remains contingent on legislator behavior, and arguably, a significant barrier to the introduction of such policies is the political under-representation of individuals belonging to minority groups who might vote in their own interest. 2 Both sets of arguments are particularly compelling in the case of India, 1 where the hierarchical caste system has contributed to the economic deprivation of those born into lower castes. At independence, the Indian State committed to use public policy to end caste-based discrimination, and to improve the economic status of disadvantaged groups. A centerpiece of this endeavor has been the implementation of the constitutional mandate which ensures the presence of legislators belonging to minority groups in state and national legislatures. This paper examines the impact of this mandated political representation on policy outcomes in India at the state level.
While many countries have experimented with mandates which seek to increase minority representation in the political process, the Indian experiment remains, by far, the most radical (Bernard Grofman and Arend Lijphart (1986) ). Prior to every state election, specified jurisdictions are declared reserved for disadvantaged castes and for tribes. Only members of the group which benefit from reservation can stand for election. However, the entire electorate votes over the set of candidates. The effect of the mandate is to alter legislator identity without affecting voter identity. The placing of requirements on candidate identity in reserved jurisdictions directly increases the political representation afforded to minority groups in the legislature. Political reservation has had a profound effect on the Indian political landscape -a quarter of all legislators in India, at both the national and state level, come from reserved jurisdictions.
The use of mandates to enhance minority political representation is predicated on the assumption that legislative capture by non-minority party members adversely affects the policy interests of minority groups, and that parties cannot fully control candidate behavior after elections (for if they could, candidate identity would be irrelevant to the policy process). This assumption is, however, invalid if a party's preferred policy is independent of its candidates identity, and parties and voters can ensure that candidate behavior after elections is guided by 2 the commitments they made beforehand -a standard assumption in many political economy models (Anthony Downs (1957) ). An analysis of the impact of political reservation on policy provides a direct empirical test of this assumption.
In the first part of the paper, I develop a simple model of political competition to show that the effectiveness of political reservation in altering policy depends on the nature of the contract between the electorate and the elected. Two important elements in this contract are whether a party is able to commit its candidates to policies and how legislators resolve policy differences within the legislature. In situations where candidate entry is mediated by political parties, changes in legislator identity brought about by reservation can only affect policy in the absence of full policy commitment. Moreover, such changes may not be significant unless every legislator has voice in the policymaking process.
In the remainder of the paper I use an Indian state-level panel data set to examine whether political reservation for scheduled castes and scheduled tribes in state elections has affected policy-making. A state-level analysis is appropriate as India is a federal democracy, with states enjoying substantial independent policy-making powers (Jean Dreze and Amartya Sen (1995)).
Moreover, the choice of affirmative action policies in favor of scheduled castes and scheduled tribes has been an important element of policy activism by state governments (Sunita Parikh (1997)).
The Indian constitution requires that the extent of state-level political reservation enjoyed by a group reflect the group's population share in the state. But, the extent of political reservation can be revised only when new census population estimates are received. Thus, while a group's population share varies continuously, the proportion of jurisdictions reserved for it changes with a lag -that is, only at the point of election, and after fresh census population estimates for 3 the group are received. I exploit this institutional feature of reservation to isolate its impact on policy outcomes. I use changes in the extent of political reservation, which are specific to a given state, to identify how changes in the group shares of minority legislators affect policy outcomes.
Since the response of political reservation to population changes is characterized by a lag I can separately control for the variable which causes changes in reservation -the census population shares of the two groups. This allows me to disentangle the effects of changes in the political representation afforded to a group on policy from those due to changes in its population share.
The main finding is that political reservation in Indian states has increased redistribution of resources in favor of the groups which benefit from political reservation. Such increases have been accompanied by increases in overall spending and decreases in spending on education programs. I interpret these findings as evidence that reservation can enhance a group's influence on policy-making, and that legislators belonging to minority groups have used this influence to increase the incidence of targeted redistribution. Whether these changes in government spending away from general redistribution programs towards targeted programs improve the well-being of either the minority groups or the polity at large remains an open question.
In conjunction with the theoretical arguments presented in this paper, the findings suggest that complete policy commitment may be absent in democracies, as is found in this case. These findings are consonant with recent political economy papers which assume that existing political institutions cannot enforce full policy commitment (see, for example, Martin Osborne and Al Slivinski (1996) , Timothy Besley and Steve Coate (1997) ). Such models of policy-making predict that increases in political representation afforded to a group will enhance its influence on policy. 3 My findings are also in line with recent empirical papers on the relationship between politi-cian identity and policy outcomes. Joseph Kalt and Mark Zupan (1985) and Steven Levitt (1996) show that a candidate's personal 'ideology' is a key determinant of observed policy outcomes. Besley and Anne Case (2000) and Raghabendra Chattopadhyay and Esther Duflo (2001) document significant differences between the policies favored by male and female politicians.
Evidence on how a country's choice of political institutions mediates the relationship between legislator identity and policy outcomes is, however, limited. My paper addresses this question in the context of a specific institution -political reservation.
The remainder of the paper is organized as follows. Section I sets out a simple model of political competition which identifies how parties' ability to commit their candidates to policies affects the impact of political reservation on policy. Section II describes the institution of political reservation, as practiced in India and the data-set used in the empirical analysis. Section III presents the empirical findings, and Section IV is the conclusion.
I. Political Reservation and the Political Process
In this section I use a theoretical example to illustrate the link between my empirical analysis and the literature on political competition in representative democracies. The objective is to show that, in a world where individuals choose representatives to select and implement policy and where parties mediate candidate entry, the possibility of policy commitment on the part of candidates affects the impact of political reservation on policy in an empirically identifiable manner.
Consider a large population of N individuals who differ in their earning potential. Each individual supplies one unit of labor, and depending on her/his earning potential either earns y r and is rich or earns y p and is poor, where y r > y p . Individuals also differ with respect to an 5 unalterable attribute, which I call caste -an individual is born either a high (H) or a low (L) caste. Let λ k c denote the population share of individuals who belong to caste c ∈ (H, L) and earn income y k , where k ∈ (r, p). I assume low caste citizens constitute a population minority (λ L < 1/2). In addition, they are more likely to be poor, i.e.
Individual income, if taxed, is taxed at rate t. Taxes can be redistributed in up to two ways.
First, via a general transfer T to all individuals and second, via a targeted transfer δ to low caste individuals (that is, δ = 0 for high caste individuals). The former redistributes income from rich to poor individuals, and the latter from high to low caste individuals. I assume that the selected redistribution policy must be budget balancing. Individual utility is increasing with own posttax income, and is denoted u k c . Formally, Individuals elect legislators to select and implement the levels of general and targeted redistribution. For expositional clarity I assume the population is divided into Z jurisdictions, with one legislator elected per jurisdiction. 5 Political competition is mediated by two political parties. The political process has three stages. At stage 1, the two parties choose one candidate per jurisdiction. At stage 2, individuals choose for whom to vote. In the final stage, elected legislators choose the type and extent of redistribution. These stages are described in reverse order.
The elected legislators select the type and extent of redistribution in the legislature. I assume that the policy influence of a legislator is proportional to, and increasing in, the group size of 6 legislators which share her policy preferences. 6 The Mathematical Appendix defines the policy determination rule.
In every jurisdiction a fraction α of the individuals are rational voters, and the remaining (1-α) fraction are noise voters. With two-party competition, sincere voting is rational. 7 Rational voters know whether or not parties can commit their candidates to policies, and vote accordingly.
Such policy commitment, if feasible, renders candidate identity irrelevant to the political process. Therefore, with full policy commitment a rational voter directly conditions her/his vote on the policies associated with a candidate. In the absence of such commitment a candidate will pursue her/his own preferred policies in the legislature, and a rational voter will condition her/his vote on both the candidate's party and group identity. In contrast, a noise voter's choice of candidate is uncorrelated with the policies associated with the candidate. The concept of noise voting captures the idea that some individuals base their voting decisions on non-policy aspects of candidate identity, such as a candidate's personal charisma. The presence of noise voters, by making election outcomes probabilistic, ensures the existence of a voting equilibrium. The Mathematical Appendix describes the voting equilibrium.
Candidate selection is undertaken by two political parties, indexed by J ∈ (R, P ). Parties are ideologically differentiated on income -party R favors the rich, and party P the poor. Each party consists of individuals who share the party's income preferences. That is, party R has rich individuals as members, and party P poor individuals. Another way of saying this is that parties function as brand names. Depending on party membership costs, an individual will either join the party which favors her/his income group or not join any political party. 8 Each party seeks to maximize its average member's utility. Formally, party J's payoff is
where ξ J is the share of low caste members in a party. I assume this share is independent of any single individual's party affiliation decision. Since the income identity of party candidates (y k ) is fixed, a party's entry decision reduces to a decision over the proportion of jurisdictions in which it fields low caste candidates. I denote this proportion as π.
A political equilibrium is a pair of party entry decisions which constitute best responses.
Every such equilibrium is associated with a probability distribution over policy outcomes. The probability that the policies associated with the election of a party's candidates are implemented equals the party's probability of electoral success.
In this setting, a party's membership base affects its entry decision in two ways. First, a party can only field members as candidates. Second, a party's payoff, and therefore its pre- Result 2 captures the idea that the impact of political reservation on policy depends on the ability of parties to commit their candidates to their preferred policies.
Result 2 If parties can commit their candidates to policies then political reservation does not affect policy outcomes. However, if such commitment is absent then, relative to an equilibrium with no low caste candidates, political reservation increases the likelihood of targeted redistribution.
Political reservation forces parties to field low caste candidates in a certain fraction of jurisdictions. If possible, a party will commit its candidates, both high-and low-caste, to its preferred policies. A party's preferred policies depend on the caste composition of its membership pool and the demographic composition of the electorate. Since neither are affected by political reservation a party's preferred policies are invariant to the introduction of reservation. Hence, with full policy commitment electoral and policy outcomes are not affected by reservation.
Result 2 tells us that in the absence of full policy commitment reservation increases the likelihood of targeted redistribution (relative to an equilibrium with no low caste candidates).
To see why this is true, remember that poor low caste individuals favor targeted redistribution.
Reservation causes party P to field poor low caste candidates who, if elected, will implement targeted redistribution. Since both parties enjoy a positive probability of winning reservation increases the likelihood of targeted redistribution. However, the magnitude of this increase will vary with the composition of the electorate.
If the population share of poor low castes is below λ * , then all low caste individuals favor targeted redistribution. In this case, with reservation targeted redistribution will occur with certainty. If, however, the population share of poor low caste individuals exceeds λ * then rich low caste individuals, like their high caste counterparts, oppose redistribution. Reservation will, therefore, only alter the policies associated with party P candidates. Hence, with reservation, the likelihood of targeted redistribution equals the probability of party P 's electoral success. 11
The analysis has assumed that a legislator's influence on policy is increasing in the group size of legislators who share her/his preferences. An alternative is to assume that policies favored by the majority group of legislators are implemented. Clearly, under this assumption, political reservation will increase targeted redistribution only if it is implemented in a majority of jurisdictions.
In sum, this model of political competition affords predictions on the conditions under which reservation will affect policies, and on which policies will be affected. Two key assumptions are that candidate entry is mediated by political parties, and that a party's preferred policy does not vary with its candidates' identity. 12 Given these assumptions, the model demonstrates that a statistically significant link between changes in the fraction of jurisdictions reserved for a minority group and the extent of redistribution targeted towards the same group can be interpreted as evidence that political parties cannot enforce policy commitment on part of their candidates and that the bargaining procedure adopted in the legislature allows these legislators influence over policy. In the remainder of this paper I use data from Indian states to test these predictions. In section 3 I exploit the institutional features of political reservation and data on its practice to provide evidence on the impact of political reservation on policy outcomes in Indian states. In the remainder of this section I describe the institution of political reservation and the data-set which will be used in the analysis.
II. Institutional Background and Data

A. Political Reservation in Indian States
The 1950 Indian constitution mandates political reservation in favor of scheduled castes and scheduled tribes in every state and national election. In addition, it explicitly directs state governments to use public policy to improve the economic well-being of these two groups.
The constitutional (scheduled caste and scheduled tribe) orders of 1950 established statespecific lists which identified the castes and tribes that fall in the categories of scheduled castes and scheduled tribes respectively. The caste identification criteria of the 1931 census formed the basis for the selection of scheduled castes, and a tribal identification criteria developed by a 1950 Parliamentary the basis for choosing scheduled tribes. Table 2 describes these criteria.
The scheduled caste and scheduled tribe lists have been revised twice -in 1956 to remove anomalies arising from the linguistic reorganization of states, and in 1976 to remove intra-state discrepancies in the identification of certain castes and tribes as scheduled castes and scheduled tribes respectively.
Scheduled castes make up roughly 16 percent of the Indian population, and scheduled tribes another 8 percent. Relative to the rest of the population, individuals belonging to these two groups remain socially and economically disadvantaged. The incidence of poverty in these groups is roughly one and a half times that in the rest of the population (see Table 3 ). The economic backwardness of scheduled castes can be directly traced to the caste system. 14 Members of scheduled castes were traditionally assigned to menial occupations such as skinning animal carcasses and removing human waste, and faced restrictions on asset ownership. The article also requires that in selecting reserved jurisdictions preference be given to jurisdictions with a higher population share of the group in whose favor reservation is being practiced, while ensuring a sufficient dispersal of reserved jurisdictions within the state. 17
My empirical analysis exploits the diachronic variation in the extent of political reservation enjoyed by a group in a state. The cause of such variation is defined by section 3 of article 332.
Section 3 states that the proportion of jurisdictions reserved for scheduled castes (scheduled 13 tribes) should equal, as nearly as possible, the population share of scheduled caste (scheduled tribe) in the state. Moreover, the only permissible basis for changes in the extent of reservation enjoyed by a group in a state is changes in the census estimates of the group's population share in that state. Table 4 lists the years in which the proportion of jurisdictions reserved for a group changed, the stated reason for change, and the commission responsible. As elections across states are not synchronized, a single commission's recommendations are often implemented in multiple years. 
B. Data and Descriptive Statistics
The unit of observation in my analysis is the Indian state. I use a data-set of the 16 major Indian states which spans the period 1960-1992. These states account for over 95 percent of the Indian population. Table 5 provides descriptive statistics.
I measure the political reservation afforded to a group in a state as the fraction of jurisdictions reserved for that group in the state. The reservation variables for scheduled castes and scheduled tribes are denoted as 'SC reservation' and 'ST reservation' respectively. In the sample, the average SC reservation is thirteen percent, and the average ST reservation is seven percent.
Three states in the sample have no scheduled tribe population, and therefore no ST reservation.
The data-set includes two measures of a group's population share. The first is the group's population share as measured by the census in the year when reservation was determined, and is denoted 'SC/ST census population share'. This variable is used by the Election and Delimitation
Commissions to determine the extent of reservation for a group. The second measure is the group's population share as measured in the current year; this variable is denoted as 'SC/ST current population share'.
The Indian constitution provides for a federal structure of government, with state governments enjoying independent jurisdiction on most types of social sector spending. In addition, the constitution explicitly allows state governments to target welfare programs towards scheduled castes and scheduled tribes. In the analysis I distinguish between two types of state public policies -policies whose benefits are not restricted to scheduled castes and/or scheduled tribes (henceforth, 'general' policies), and policies whose benefits are so restricted (henceforth, 'targeted' policies). In the category of targeted policies, I consider two measures of targeted spending. These are the fraction of government spending devoted to scheduled caste and scheduled tribe welfare programs, and are denoted as 'SC welfare spending' and 'ST welfare spending' respectively.
The programs financed by such spending include, among others, group housing projects, hostels for students belonging to these groups, and the provision of public goods in scheduled caste and scheduled tribe hamlets. The average state spends between 3 − 4 percent of its budget on each of these two categories of targeted spending. Finally, I consider job quotas which is the fraction of state government jobs reserved for scheduled castes and scheduled tribes. In the sample, the mean fraction of state government jobs so reserved is 20 percent. Arguably, increases in the extent of job reservation has been the most important political concession granted to scheduled castes and scheduled tribes in post-independence India (Mendelsohn and Vicziany (1998) , Parikh (1997) ). 20
III. Results
Variation in the percentage of jurisdictions reserved for a group in a state is attributable to changes in the census population estimates for the group. Such changes are caused by the arrival of fresh population census estimates and nationwide institutional changes, as outlined in Table 4 . Hence, reservation for a group is a non-linear function of the group's population in the most recent census. I exploit this feature of political reservation to identify its impact on policy.
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A. Basic Results
For the sth state at time t, I can write:
where Y st is a policy outcome, and R st is a vector whose elements are SC reservation and ST reservation respectively. α s and β t are state and year fixed effects, and ε st is the state-level error term. The reservation coefficient γ is the parameter of primary interest. State effects control for the influence of unobserved time invariant state characteristics on policy. Year effects control for the policy effects of national events which affect all states in a similar manner; they, however, do not control for national events which affect different states differentially.
In this empirical specification identification of the effect of political reservation on policy outcomes is obtained from within-state variation, i.e. state-specific changes in reservation. As discussed above, such changes are caused by changes in a group's census population share. The main threat to the validity of this identification strategy is omitted effects of the factors which determine reservation, of which lagged population effects of a group seem most likely to be of concern. To guard against such omitted variable bias I sequentially expand the set of covariates.
I start by including SC and ST census population shares (P st * ) as right-hand side variables. I, then, add the two groups current population shares (P st ) as covariates. the election dummy is included to ensure that the reservation variables do not simply pick up election year effects. To summarize, the final specification is of the form:
Tables 6 and 7 report the findings for general and targeted policies, respectively. For each policy I report four specifications, where I sequentially expand the set of covariates. Columns (1)- (4) of Table 6 consider total spending. Increases in ST reservation, but not SC reservation, raise total spending in a state. The estimated effect is robust to the inclusion of additional population and economic controls (columns (2)- (4)). Columns (5)- (8) I next consider policies whose benefits are explicitly targeted towards scheduled castes and/or scheduled tribes. The results in Table 7 suggest a significant relationship between reservation and these policies. Moreover, I find evidence that the impact of SC reservation and ST reservation on policy differs. The results in columns (1)- (4) reveal a positive correlation between SC reservation and job quotas. The effect is large and significant, and robust to the inclusion of population and other controls. To give some idea of magnitudes, the estimates in column (4) tells us that a one percent rise in SC reservation is associated with a 0.6 percent increase in job quotas. In contrast, SC reservation is unrelated to the level of SC welfare spending (columns (5)- (8)), and ST welfare spending (columns (9)- (12)). These findings stand in sharp contrast to those for ST reservation. Columns (1)- (3) show that increases in ST reservation do not significantly affect job quotas; there is weak evidence of a negative effect in column (4). However, ST reservation has a significant positive effect on ST welfare spending. The estimates in column (12) suggests that a one point increase in ST reservation increases the share of total state spending devoted to ST welfare programs by 0.8 percentage points. 22
The finding that SC reservation increases job quotas while ST reservation increases spending on ST welfare programs is consistent with differences in scheduled caste and scheduled tribe group characteristics. Relative to scheduled tribes, scheduled caste individuals are both more educated and geographically more dispersed. Hence, their relative returns from individualspecific policies, such as job quotas, are higher. In contrast, relative to scheduled castes, the benefits to scheduled tribe individuals from geographically localized welfare programs such as housing schemes are greater. The finding that ST, but not SC, reservation increases targeted spending also helps us make sense of the finding in Table 6 that increases in ST reservation reduce education spending, and raise overall spending. Taken together, these results suggest that some of the observed increases in targeted redistribution have come at the expense of general redistribution.
Finally, Tables 6 and 7 reveal interesting differences in the relationship that SC and ST current population share variables bear to the policy outcomes. Increases in SC current population shares are associated with increases in job quotas and reductions in ST welfare spending.
In contrast, increases in ST current population share are negatively correlated with most policy outcomes. While the potentially endogenous nature of these population variables prevents a causal interpretation, these findings are consistent with the fact that the political activism of members of these two groups differs significantly. While scheduled castes have emerged as an important political bloc in post-Independence India, scheduled tribes remain, by and large, politically marginalized. 23
B. Robustness
The empirical analysis exploits state specific variation in political reservation to examine its effects on policy outcomes. In this empirical set-up key robustness checks are sensitivity of the results to the introduction of additional controls for variables that may be in the function determining reservation. As discussed, changes in reservation are attributable to changes in the groups' population shares, as reported by the census. 24 Table 8 examines the robustness of the findings to including additional population controls as covariates. For expositional ease, I
restrict the analysis to the subset of policies which have been shown to be affected by political reservation.
All regressions reported in Table 8 In column (2), I include the one-and two-period lagged values of SC and ST current population shares as covariates. Once again, the size and significance of the estimated relationship between SC and ST reservation and policy outcomes is largely unchanged. In column (3), I include a state-specific piecewise linear trend. For any given state, this trend variable increases by increments of one in years in which reservation for a group changed in a state. This trend variable can be viewed as partially controlling for any omitted variables which also change at the point when reservation for a group changes. I find no significant change in the estimated relationship between reservation and policy outcomes.
As a final check, I examine whether the results are robust to restricting the sample for each state to five year periods that are centered around an election in which the proportion of jurisdictions reserved for a group changed. The idea is to check whether the discontinuous changes in political reservation which occur in election year are associated with subsequent policy changes.
The results are presented in column (4) . Reductions in the sample implies greater imprecision in the estimated relationship between reservation and policy outcomes, i.e., the standard errors tend to be larger. However, both the size and significance of the estimated effects are robust to the reduction in sample size. The only exception is total spending -in this case, the effect of ST reservation is statistically insignificant (though the economic magnitude of the estimated effect remains comparable to that found with other specifications). The discontinuity sample specification increases our confidence that omitted variable bias is not driving the observed relationship 21 between political reservation and policy outcomes -there is less reason to believe that the impact of omitted population variables on policy outcomes would follow a similar discontinuous pattern.
In Pande (1999) I report additional robustness checks. I show that the results are robust to including an array of contemporaneous state economic, demographic and political variables.
I also consider specifications which control for inter-state migration -the concern being that policy induced migration may underlie observed population, and therefore reservation, changes.
In addition, I show that the results are robust to using a two stage least square procedure which instruments for SC and ST current population share. This is to guard against possible measurement error bias in the regression induced by the use of interpolated population data for inter-census years. 25
In summary, the regressions reported in Table 8 However, in this case both voter and legislator identity were altered. As a result, isolating the effects of changes in legislator identity on policy has proven difficult. The nature of the political reservation mandate in India allows us to make progress on this issue.
To isolate the effect of legislator identity on policy outcomes I use time lags in the response of political reservation to population changes. Such time lags arise because the fraction of jurisdictions reserved for a group is adjusted to take account of changes in a group's population share only when new population census estimates arrive. Using decennial census estimates for electoral practices is a commonly adopted practice in most democracies. This suggests that it may be possible to use variants of the identification strategy adopted in this paper to provide empirical evidence on other features of the political process. For instance, in many countries jurisdiction boundaries are redrawn after every decennial census to ensure equal populations in each jurisdiction. The time lags between actual population growth across jurisdictions and the equalization of population across jurisdictions may be used to isolate the political consequences of legislative redistricting.
This paper provides evidence that increased political representation for disadvantaged minorities can allow them greater influence on policy-making. I show that political reservation for scheduled castes and scheduled tribes in India has, in part, been responsible for the observed rise in targeted redistribution towards these groups over the last half-century. These findings also shed light on the functioning of the political process in India. In general, political reservation can affect policy outcomes only when parties cannot enforce policy commitment on the part of their candidates, and even then its effect remains sensitive to the decision-making procedures adopted in the legislature.
It would, however, be premature to view this paper's findings as suggesting that political reservation is a welfare-enhancing policy. To start with, neither the theoretical nor the empirical analysis has examined the implications of political reservation for candidate quality. It is wholly feasible that the restrictions on candidate entry which are required by a policy of political reservation adversely affect the quality of candidates. Such restrictions may also reduce the ability of voters (and parties) to punish candidates who engage in wasteful redistribution or corrupt political practices. Policies chosen by minority legislators may also be more likely to reflect the policy preferences of special interest groups. For instance, minority individuals may be more easily intimidated by members of the majority social group. Alternatively, they may be more willing to curry favors along group identity lines. Finally, a candidate's social identity as a primary prerequisite may lead to individuals belonging to non-minority groups becoming more disengaged from, and disaffected by, the political process. All these factors go to suggest that the extent to which enhanced political representation for a group translates into improved welfare outcomes for members of these groups, and the polity at large, remains an open and important question for future research. Clearly, the findings in this paper suggest that one important element of any such research agenda must involve understanding the relative successes of targeted and broad-based redistribution in affecting the welfare of such groups.
Mathematical Appendix
The appendix is structured as follows. First, the voting equilibrium and the decision-making rule in the legislature are described. Second, the proof for Result 1 is provided.
Voting equilibrium In every jurisdiction a fraction α of the voters are rational, and a fraction the difference between the number of voters who favor party P, and those who favor party R.
The party P candidate wins if
In probability terms a party P candidate wins in every jurisdiction with probability φ(ε), where α) ) otherwise. I assume that the fraction of noise voters in a jurisdiction is sufficiently high, so that
Under this assumption, a party which only attracts a single demographic group's vote will enjoy a positive probability of winning.
Legislative procedure Identical jurisdictions imply that the same electoral outcome occurs in every jurisdiction. Hence, all legislators share the same party identity. If possible, a party will commit its candidates to the party preferred policy. Hence, with full policy commitment the policy favored by the winning party will be implemented by its legislators (all of whom will have 29 been committed to this policy).
In the absence of full policy commitment legislative conflict may arise. Let δ Jc and T Jc be the levels of targeted and non-targeted redistribution favored by a caste c legislator belonging to party J. I assume that the policy influence of a legislator is increasing in the group size of legislators who share her/his policy preferences. Here, this group size is given by the number of legislators with the same income and caste identity. Given that income identity is fixed within a party, the legislative policy determination rule is defined as:
I assume ψ(0) = 0, and proof: This proof considers the case where the low caste party membership share is less than their population share, i.e ξ J < λ L . If policy commitment is feasible then prior to an election each party will commit its candidates to its preferred policies. Since candidate identity is irrelevant to the political process, π P = π R = 0 constitutes a pair of best responses. Now consider the case where full policy commitment is infeasible. If π P = π R = 0, then party P will be associated with general redistribution and party R with no redistribution. Rational voters will vote for the party which represents her/his income group, and party P will win with probability φ(λ p -λ r ). In equilibrium no targeted redistribution will occur. The remainder of the proof shows that π P = π R = 0 constitute a pair of best responses for the two parties.
(i) If λ p > λ * then rich low caste individuals favor no redistribution. Hence, irrespective of caste identity, all party R members favor no redistribution. π R = 0 constitutes a best response. In contrast, low and high caste members of party P will favor different policies. If party P deviates to π P > 0, then its election causes both targeted and general redistribution (see legislative procedure definition). Such a deviation, however, cannot improve party P 's payoff. First, as rich citizens do not favor redistribution this deviation can not increase its probability of electoral success. Second, under the assumption ξ J < λ L this deviation lowers the party's payoff if the po. Hence π P = 0 is a dominant strategy for party P .
(ii) If λ p < λ * then rich low caste individuals favor targeted redistribution. In this case given π R = 0, π P = 0 is a best response. To see this consider a deviation by party P to π P > 0. 
This inequality cannot hold if the share of low caste members in a party is less than its population share, i.e. ξ P < λ L . For, in this case the left hand side is negative while the right hand side is positive. It follows that given π R = 0, π P = 0 is a best response. A symmetric argument establishes that π R = 0 constitutes a best response to π P = 0.
Data Appendix
The data-set used in this paper builds on an Indian state-level data-set which was collated by Berk Ozler, Gaurav Datt and Martin Ravallion (1996) , and updated by Besley and Burgess 
